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INTERACTIVE KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGES UNDER COMPLEX SOCIAL RELATIONS 
A SIMULATION MODEL1 
Robin Cowan2 and Anant Kamath3 
January 2013 
ABSTRACT 
 
This is a model of knowledge exchange by means of informal interaction among agents in low technology 
clusters. What this study seeks to do is to colour these exchanges by placing them in an environment of 
complex social relations, test whether the small-world network structure is the most favourable for 
knowledge exchanges in these environments, and explore the influence of social relations and network 
distance. These enquiries are the contribution of this model to the existing series of studies on efficient 
network structures for knowledge diffusion. We find that the small-world network structure may not be the 
best network structure for highest and most equitable knowledge distribution, when knowledge exchanges 
are undertaken in environments of complex social relations. Also, we confirm that the highest and most 
equitable knowledge distribution is achieved when there is perfect affinity among the agents.  
 
KEYWORDS: Knowledge Exchanges, Small-Worlds, Social Networks, Complex Social Relations 
JEL CLASSIFICATION: O33, Z13 
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1. Introduction 
This is a model of knowledge exchange by means of informal interaction among agents in low 
technology clusters, these clusters constituting a vast majority in a developing country like India. 
These clusters survive primarily on informal information exchanges, without which agents would 
be trapped with obsolete knowledge, and would never be able to source the new knowledge 
required to progress towards the technology frontier at which their peers are operating. The 
appreciation of knowledge exchanges by means of informal interaction through social networks is 
not superficial any more in the knowledge diffusion literature, and hence this study does not seek 
to re-investigate simple barter-like knowledge exchanges. What this study seeks to do is to colour 
these exchanges by placing them in an environment of complex social relations, test whether the 
small-world network structure is the most favourable for knowledge exchanges, and explore the 
influence of social relations and network distance.  
Studies in the past (such as those by Cowan and Jonard) on knowledge diffusion across 
networks deal with the importance of network structure for equity and efficiency of knowledge 
distribution – an enquiry that remains necessary when we deal with rural traditional-technology 
clusters whose only source of new knowledge is by informal interaction. But the analysis has to 
be extended by setting it in environments of complex social relations that are often inevitable in 
this category of clusters. On the one hand informal knowledge exchanges may be clean and 
untouched by any sort of social barriers among units that are relatively homogeneous in their 
economic and social attributes (as in an environment of perfect affinity between agents), while on 
the other hand, these exchanges may arise as emergent properties of the social differences in a 
more heterogeneous environment (as in a regime of complex social relations, or, at an extreme, of 
severe homophily). Even today, in traditional technology clusters, long existing social prejudices 
and affinities may still hold and may influence knowledge exchanges. It might pay for agents to 
cross these long existing social group demarcations to access new knowledge, but probably not 
always since reciprocity, value introjection and solidarity may take primacy over economic self-
interest. It is in these environments that the often established supremacy of the small-world 
network structure is tested in this study.  
Hence, this study has two objectives. First, we test the hypothesis that the small-world 
network structure is still the most efficient for information diffusion through informal knowledge 
exchange in a cluster even in a complex social relations environment. And second, we explore the 
effect of – (1) intensity of social relations in a cluster, and (2) influence of network distance as a 
concern among knowledge exchanging agents – on the performance of the cluster. These 
enquiries are the contribution of this model to the existing series of studies on efficient network 
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structures for knowledge diffusion. In the next section, we review the background to this study, 
by visiting studies on informal knowledge exchanges, network structure and efficient diffusion of 
knowledge. 
2. Network Structure and Efficient Knowledge Diffusion  
2.1 Informal Knowledge Exchange and Networks 
Exchanging new knowledge on the latest and best production practices and technologies, on a 
continuous basis, free of monetary cost, even to rivals, has often been considered by economists 
as “an undesired ‘leakage’ that reduces the incentives to invent” (Allen, 1983:21). But this 
activity is neither undesired, nor a leakage, and certainly does not reduce the incentive to invent. 
It is, according to Allen, an oft invoked practice of pursuing free release and exchange of 
information, since it is almost impossible and often expensive to keep knowledge as a secret and 
may sometimes work to the knowledge-giver’s professional advantage to actually release the 
information4. Most information flows through informal channels of word-of-mouth knowledge 
exchanges and through social circles (Allen et al., 1983). In this environment, low-tech producers 
do not perform R&D as a continuous activity with internal investment exclusively dedicated to it; 
rather, they satisfice, i.e., they undertake a conscious local search among their co-located and 
connected peers for improvements to their present technologies and production practices, 
especially when performance is below par compared to observable peers (Romijn, 1999).  
According to Cowan (2004), social space matters for knowledge exchange and diffusion 
and can best be understood in the context of networks. Agents acquire new information and learn 
more through their networks than through codified sources; “whom you know” has a significant 
bearing on “what you know”, this being one of the most consistent findings in social science 
literature (Cross et al., 2003:8). Especially for low-tech firms, networking becomes a lifeline for 
survival and endurance. This was recognized by Allen et al. (1983), who proposed that networks 
developed in many industries for the sole purpose of disseminating information. If broadcasting 
information to ‘those you know’, ‘those you trust’, and ‘those who are guaranteed to reciprocate’ 
is a vital process of a region’s existence and growth, the structure of the networks that form this 
region become vital for performance (Cowan and Jonard, 2003). Bougrain and Haudeville (2002) 
describe how networks allow small units to decode and appropriate large flows of information 
since they provide for the observation of strategic choices made by peers. Personal networks, 
Bougrain and Haudeville say, assist in transfer of tacit knowledge, as knowing ‘who holds the 
                                                 
4 See also von Hippel (1987, 1988) who wrote extensively on ‘informal cooperative R&D’, involving 
routine and informal trading of information, between even direct rivals. 
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information’ is decisive in tough situations. Also, whether these networks are formal or informal, 
they help small units reduce the uncertainties and costs of irreversible decisions and resource 
allocations, by having access to new knowledge and to more experienced actors in the arena.  
 While codified knowledge can be diffused impersonally, the diffusion of tacit knowledge, 
especially if broadcast over a small space and over a few selected recipients, is heavily dependent 
on the structure of and relations within localized, informal information networks (Cowan and 
Jonard, 2003; Cowan, 2004). Individuals may adopt new knowledge or accept new production 
practices by gathering information from those whom she interacts with frequently – often 
neighbours – which on an aggregate, shapes innovation and learning in a region (Bala and Goyal, 
1998; Goyal, 2007). It can therefore be proposed that interactive learning is essentially an 
emergent property of network structure and relations, especially where agents prefer learning 
through networks than through codified sources.  
The idea of social networks shaping business and production relations between economic 
agents is not new, and rich strands of literature in economic sociology and management research 
have been devoted to it. The nature of knowledge exchange is often contingent on the social 
identity of the economic agents exchanging it, as work by Brian Uzzi (1996, 1997, for instance), 
among others, have illustrated in detail. Hence, production and exchange relations cannot be 
disregarded as being peripheral to social relations, and they may even develop as its emergent 
properties. Rogers, in his Diffusion of Innovations (Rogers, 1995), had stated that the ability of an 
economic agent to learn or innovate has been found to be affected not only by individual 
character but also the nature of the social system in which the agent is a member. That is, 
economic activities are, in most cases, embedded in social relations. Hence, investigating the 
effect of community character emerges as important as investigating into individual agent 
behaviour (Akçomak, 2009).  
Networks gain prominence here, serving as vehicles not only for learning but also for 
reinforcing social norms and values, defining the nature of the social capital of the region. 
Networks act in a dual role as vehicles for knowledge exchange as well as for reinforcing social 
norms and values. They become a cluster’s principal component and the vehicle on which 
learning is facilitated. Consequently, investigation into social networks emerges as more than just 
an appealing metaphor or vocabulary by providing a precise way to test theories and propositions 
about social relationships (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). 
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2.2 Network Structure and Knowledge Diffusion 
To understand learning, diffusion and innovative performance especially where tacit knowledge 
is freely exchanged or bartered to a subset of potentially interested agents, network dynamics and 
the structure of the network have to be examined, for which network models of diffusion provide 
an ideal venue (Cowan and Jonard, 2003; Cowan, 2004). A series of papers by Cowan and Jonard 
(Cowan, 2004; Cowan and Jonard, 2003, 2004, 2007) on knowledge diffusion across networks 
provide the basis for the model and analysis in this paper. In these models, the network structure 
is the pivotal element that decides the nature of knowledge exchanges and long run performance 
(in terms of mean knowledge level in the system, and speed and equity of knowledge 
distribution). They demonstrate that while short paths (and therefore a random network) diffuse 
knowledge the fastest, and that cliquishness brings about advantages that provide the very basis 
for clusters, it is generally a small-world network structure – employing the advantages of both 
short path lengths and cliquishness – that reigns. A small-world network5 is a type of network 
structure which enjoys the best of local cohesiveness with proximity (which provide for rapid 
initial growth agents) as well as distant links (to access knowledge beyond the immediate locale 
which provide for continued growth) (Cowan, 2004). This result rigorously demonstrates an old 
theme in the diffusion literature on the strength of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) which deals with 
the fact that while strong ties (and therefore strong cliques in networks) provide obvious benefits, 
it is weak ties (and therefore short path lengths) that provide the basis for continued progress and 
to source new ideas and know-how. While framing policy for clusters too, this recognition is 
important (reflected also by Cowan and Jonard, 2004:1572 and 2007:109). 
Cowan and Jonard (2003) study the importance of network architecture on collective 
invention and the rate of innovation, and find that the structure of the network plays a 
fundamental role. They demonstrate the qualities of the small-world network as an efficient 
architecture, especially when absorptive capacity is low6. Cowan and Jonard (2004) study 
diffusion, treating it as a process of barter and exchange, where the barter occurs when it is 
mutually profitable for the exchanging agents. Their results also demonstrate that the small-world 
network structure is the most efficient architecture where average knowledge reaches its highest 
                                                 
5 While Watts and Strogatz (1998) and Watts (1999) are popular citations for the small-world network 
structure, Freeman (2004) points out that it was Ithiel de Sola Pool and Manfred Kochen who introduced 
the term small-world in the network context, through a 1958 manuscript, which was republished as De Sola 
Pool and Kochen (1978), twenty years later. A 1967 article by Stanley Milgram drew from the 1958 
manuscript, and it was only subsequent to Milgram (and unaware of the de Sola Pool and Kochen study) 
that Watts and Strogatz based their popular 1998 work on the small-world structure (Freeman, 2004:164). 
6 The only situation where the small-world network structure does not rule in this model is when 
knowledge is easy to transmit and absorb. A random network is most efficient in this case. 
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steady state and coefficient of variation is lowest. Cowan, Jonard and Özman (2004) take one step 
ahead and allow for the receiver of the new knowledge to innovate and leap ahead of the 
broadcaster, a behaviour that is common among competing firms in an industry where becoming 
the innovation leader is a top priority. Cowan and Jonard (2007) also moves further by analysing 
the relationship between network structure, population structure and scarcity of knowledge. They 
find that at an individual level, agents that have a large number of links (i.e., networks with 
structural holes, characteristic of younger industries) do well when knowledge is scarce, while 
individuals with cliquish links (i.e., networks with strong social capital, characteristic of mature 
industries) do well when knowledge is abundant and knowledge trading happens fervently. 
Hence, one of the most consistent findings in the series of papers by Cowan and Jonard is 
that network structure is pivotal for knowledge diffusion and, in the 2003 and 2004 studies, that 
the small-world network structure is generally the most effective in progress and diffusion of 
knowledge, barring exceptional circumstances. Of all the studies, Cowan and Jonard (2004) is the 
most influential for this paper. And like Cowan and Jonard (2004), there is no innovation in this 
model, only knowledge exchange and learning. 
3. The Model 
3.1 Introduction 
A cluster is comprised of N economic agents, each agent i connected to n other agents. Locations 
are fixed, but all agents can observe everyone else’s production at all times across the cluster. 
Each agent’s operates by a production function where capital and labour are fixed, so output is 
determined by an agent’s efficiency ai. For each agent, therefore, Qi takes the form: 
Qi = Kai [1]  
...where there is a vector of efficiency of knowledge A = [ai] 
Agents in the cluster are equally distributed into η social groups, which have differing 
affinities to each other, represented in the NxN affinity matrix M. The social network is fixed, and 
generates an NxN social distance matrix D, where 
D = [dij]  [2] 
 
Every agent in every period can observe each agent’s productivity. An agent i is always 
on the lookout that she does not lag behind others in the cluster in terms of productivity, and the 
manner in which this is possible is to ensure that her productivity not too far behind that of the 
other (N-1) agents in the cluster, which she does by gaining knowledge through interacting. An 
  7
agent’s decision-making process on whether or not to interact is based on evaluation of her 
payoffs from interacting. Agent i becomes a ‘learner’ when she observes that her know-how ai is 
less than aj, the know-how of another agent j, who she views as a potential ‘teacher’.  
 If i learns from j, the potential knowledge gain is Δaij 
Δaij = max (0, aj – ai)  [3] 
 
But only a part of the know-how difference between teacher and learner, i.e., Δaij =aj - ai 
can actually be absorbed or learnt by i, this fraction denoted by an absorptive capacity parameter 
α (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), set constant for all agents in the cluster. So while j may in 
principle be willing to share kij in its entirety, the learner i can hope to gain only αΔaij. Network 
distance dij between i and her potential teacher j is of consequence, its importance manifested in 
this model as parameter eL, the ‘strength of network distance’, which has a negative effect for the 
learner as dij increases. Hence, there are two elements that bound learning: absorptive capacity 
and network distance. 
There are two opposing effects of teaching that influence the teacher j while deciding 
whether or not to teach i. First is a ‘warm glow’, a positive effect in the form of a ‘reward’ for 
teaching. Second is a ‘teaching irritation’ β, an negative effect on account of time lost in 
production due to effort put in to teaching, which increases with Δaij  as the bigger the knowledge 
gap, the more the teacher must struggle to teach.  
 
3.2 Inter-Agent Affinities and Rewards 
Agents have varying affinities with one another in this cluster. Matrix M shows affinity between 
the agents. For a cluster with N agents, 
 
M = 
 1 m12 m13 m14 ... m1N   0 < mij < 1 
 m21 1 m23 m24 ... m2N   mij = mji 
 m31 m32 1 m34 ... m3N   mii = 1 
  ... ... ... ... ... ...    
  mN 1 m N 2 m N 3 m N 4 ... 1    
 
 
Here, mij is a measure of the affinity between two agents i and j. Values of m range from 0 
(complete prejudice) to 1 (complete affinity). Main diagonal elements are 1, out of each agent 
having perfect affinity towards oneself. There are four kinds of affinity matrices in this model, 
one without complexity in social relations, and three with complex social relations. 
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(1) M1, Perfect Affinity: an identity matrix, i.e., where all elements mij in M are 1 signifying 
complete affinity between agents, and in some sense, ‘simple’ social relations.  
(2) M2, Group Level Complex Relations: where M becomes a block matrix. Each block G is a 
group of agents in one of the η social groups in the cluster. Gab shows affinity between two 
social groups a and b, where 0 < Gab < 1. All agents in one group have equal affinity or 
prejudice towards all agents of another group, and all agents in a group have, naturally, the 
same affinity to one another. That is: 
 
M = 
 1 G12 G13 G14 ... G1η   0 < Gab < 1 
 G21 1 G23 G24 ... G2η   Gab = Gba 
 G31 G32 1 G34 ... G3η   Gaa = 1 
  ... ... ... ... ... ...    
  Gη 1 Gη 2 Gη 3 Gη 4 ... 1    
 
(3) M3, Perfect Homophily: here, M becomes a block diagonal matrix where diagonal elements 
of M are 1 and all other Gab are 0, showing severe homophily between social groups. 
(4) M4, Individual Level Complex Relations: where M is composed of entirely heterogeneous 
mij , i.e., affinities and prejudices at an individual level. Only mii are 1. 
 
Agents receive social rewards and penalties upon interacting, these based on the relations, 
i.e., affinities Gab, between their social groups. The influence of these rewards and penalties are 
understood as a ‘strength of affinity’ effect γ, a parameter that manifests in their payoffs.  
A learner is not rewarded at all for interacting with teachers from her own group, and 
increasingly rewarded for interacting with teachers from groups increasing in prejudice for the 
effort she has made in crossing a social barrier and accessing a more well-informed sub-network 
in the cluster. A teacher on the other hand is not rewarded at all for teaching an agent from a 
strongly prejudiced group, increasingly rewarded when she teaches agents in groups with 
increasing affinities and highly rewarded for teaching learners from the same social group, for 
helping reinforce group position. The reward for teaching within the same group is the highest. 
This is summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1 Rewards for Learners and Teachers, based on Affinities 
Affinities Learner Teacher 
1 (highest) Reward is lowest Reward is highest 
Decreasing from 0.99 Reward increases Reward decreases 
0.01 (lowest) Reward is highest Reward is lowest 
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3.3 Mechanics 
Know-how ai is randomly assigned to all N agents, and elements mij and Gab also are randomly 
assigned. We randomly pick an agent i in the cluster and calculate Δaij with other (N-i) agents in 
the cluster, to look for potential teachers. For agent i for all agents in the cluster with whom 
Δaij>0, the decision to pick teacher j is contingent on the payoff ΠLij known as the ‘learner’s 
payoff’ in this model. To recall, there are three elements that feature for the learner: an absorptive 
capacity parameter α, a strength of network distance parameter eL, and the strength of affinity 
parameter γ. 
    ΠijL= ൫ࢻ∆ࢇ࢏࢐൯ െ ൫eL.dij൯ െ γ൫mij൯  [4] 
 
The objective of learner i is to find out which potential teacher j in the cluster maximizes 
[5]. Li is a vector of payoffs from learning from agents 1...N in the cluster.  
 
 Li= ൣΠijL ……… ΠiN)L ൧   [5] 
 
For teacher j to decide whether or not to teach agent i we construct a teaching payoff ΠTji. 
To recall, there are two elements influencing teaching: an irritation element β, and the strength of 
affinity parameter γ that is variable in affinities. The latter is a warm glow with a high reward 
when mji is high. Hence, the teacher’s payoff is: 
ΠjiT= γ൫mji൯ - β   [6], where β increases with Δaij   
 
The teacher j calculates [6] and teaches only if it is positive.  
 
The direction of decision making is learner→teacher, i.e., first a random learner i is 
picked, her ΠLij and Li is computed, and then corresponded with ΠTji of the teacher j.  
Only when both learner and teacher agree do interaction and knowledge exchange 
proceed. If there is an agreement, at t+1, the learner i’s know-how increases by αΔaij, hence 
ait+1= ai + αΔaij   [7] 
In case ΠTij<0 for all j, there is no interaction and know-how remains the same for the learner, i.e., 
     ait+1= ai 
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4. Network Analysis and Settings 
Having constructed the decision-making rules of the model, we now proceed to enquire, for each 
of the social relations regimes M1, M2, M3 and M4, the network structure fostering the highest 
and most equitable knowledge diffusion in the cluster. We simulate interactions for knowledge 
exchange in the cluster across a three kinds of network structure (linear-, small-world- and 
random network structures), for four kinds of relations between the social groups in the cluster, 
represented by four affinity matrices listed above. Many studies of know-how exchange and 
diffusion, reviewed in section 2, have convincingly shown that the small-world network structure 
appears as the most efficient and equitable for knowledge diffusion among clustered agents 
engaging in barter and free broadcast of know-how when links are randomly generated. We 
follow an enquiry on network structure quite similar to the Cowan and Jonard series of studies, 
testing for various network structures on a simple diffusion process between boundedly rational 
agents, only that our model is coloured with social relations and their ramifications. For 
simulation, we introduce a cluster with N=1000 agents, divided into η=10 social groups, each 
agent possessing n=4 connections and an absorptive capacity α=0.80. In each of the four social 
relations regimes we rewire the cluster’s network in three arrangements corresponding to log p 
values p=0.001 (ordered linear network), p=0.10 (small-world network) and p=1 (random 
network). Hence, we have twelve sets of results: for three network structures in each of the four 
social relations regimes. 
Upon allowing the agents in the cluster to perform for 10,000 iterative periods (each 
‘period’ being the entire mechanics of interaction that occurs over section 3 from surveying 
potential teachers to actually absorbing the new knowledge), we calculate a number of measures 
over each network structure for each social relations regime (i.e., for each p value across each M 
regime). For each p value, we calculate average knowledge AvgK of the cluster (i.e, the average 
of all agents’ ai) and coefficient of variation7 CoeffVar (of the entire cluster’s ai) in know-how in 
the cluster. 
The hypotheses we test in our analysis, that stem out of the two objectives of this study as 
listed at the end of section 1, are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The small-world network structure is still the most efficient network structure for 
knowledge diffusion, in terms of performance (AvgK and CoeffVar), in an environment coloured 
with complex social relations. 
                                                 
7 We use coefficient of variation instead of a simple measure of variance since as, advised by Cowan and 
Jonard (2003:10), results shown by a measure of variance can be misleading when the mean increases 
through scaling effects.  
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Hypothesis 2a: A regime with perfect affinity and no complexity in social relations, namely M1, 
is the regime that achieves highest performance in terms of both AvgK and CoeffVar. 
Hypothesis 2b: A regime with perfect homophily, namely M3, is the regime that performs best 
among the complex social relations regimes M2, M3, and M4. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Strong affinity effects (captured by the ‘strength of affinity’ parameter γ) and 
network distance effects (captured by the ‘strength of network distance’ parameter eL) generally 
decrease AvgK in the cluster as a whole. 
Hypothesis 3b: Strong affinity effects (captured by γ) and network distance effects (captured by 
eL) generally worsen equity, i.e., increase CoeffVar in the cluster as a whole. 
5. Results  
The first part of this section looks at results compared across network structures for each social 
relations regime, while the second part looks at individual effects of γ and eL. More often than 
not, M2 (affinities and prejudices between social groups) and M4 (affinities and prejudices 
between individuals, without social groups) share rather similar results, which is also the case 
with M1 (perfect affinity) and M3 (severe homophily). Hence, most results discussed for M2 are 
applicable to M4, similarly most M1 results are applicable to M3. In this study, M2 takes focus 
over the other three regimes, as this is the regime where interactions occur in complex social 
relations environments across social groups. 
 
5.1 Performance across Social Relations Regimes and across Network Structures  
In this section, we compare results across the three network structures and across the affinity 
regimes. We know from the literature that small-world networks by far allow for the most 
efficient and equitable knowledge distribution among network structures as they capture the 
benefits of both high cliquishness and short path lengths. In an ordered network, cliquishness is 
very high but path length is low, permitting quick transfer of knowledge among proximate nodes 
but slow diffusion to far-off nodes, which also means that they are inefficient in quickly tapping 
valuable information from distant nodes. Random networks on the other hand may surmount the 
network distance issue, but problems arise due to low cliquishness. Hence, small-world networks, 
which provide for the benefits both short path length and high cliquishness, provide the most 
efficient and equitable knowledge diffusion and distribution. In our model, we test this result for 
networks where interactions and knowledge diffusion are coloured with complex social relations, 
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with affinities and prejudices among agents. We see here that small-world networks are not 
particularly efficient either in knowledge diffusion or in equitable knowledge distribution. Let us 
see the results for each type of network structure.  
 We compare the magnitudes of AvgK and CoeffVar between network structures and 
across social relations regimes. First, we ask at which network structure each social relations 
regime scores its respective highest AvgK and lowest CoeffVar. Second, we find out which social 
relations regime scores the highest AvgK and the lowest CoeffVar for each network structure. 
After this, we study the underlying dynamics of knowledge exchange in each network structure, 
for each social relations regime. 
5.1.1 Performance of network structure across social relations regimes  
For our study, which wishes to contribute to the existing series of studies on the superiority of the 
small-world network structure, the results discussed in this section are of prime importance. We 
ask here at which network structure each social relations regime performs the best. For this, we 
refer to the results in Table 2 and Table 3. These tables display, in simple terms, at what network 
structure each M regime has its respective highest AvgK (Table 2) or lowest CoeffVar (Table 3). 
 
Table 2 Network Structure at which each Regime scores Highest AvgK 
M1 
Perfect  
Affinity 
M2 
Group Level  
Complex Relations 
M3 
Perfect  
Homophily 
M4 
Individual Level  
Complex Relations 
Network 
Structure 
Highest 
AvgK 
Network 
Structure 
Highest 
AvgK 
Network 
Structure 
Highest 
AvgK 
Network 
Structure 
Highest 
AvgK 
Random 0.835 Ordered 0.816 Ordered 0.801 Random 0.813 
Small-World 0.834 Small-World 0.811 Small-World 0.762 Small-World 0.794 
Ordered 0.833 Random 0.805 Random 0.678 Ordered 0.780 
 
Table 3 Network Structure at which each Regime scores Lowest CoeffVar 
M1 
Perfect  
Affinity 
M2 
Group Level  
Complex Relations 
M3 
Perfect  
Homophily 
M4 
Individual Level  
Complex Relations 
Network 
Structure 
Lowest 
CoeffVar
Network 
Structure 
Lowest 
CoeffVar
Network 
Structure
Lowest 
CoeffVar
Network 
Structure 
Lowest 
CoeffVar
Ordered 0.209 Ordered 0.215 Ordered 0.218 Random 0.256 
Random 0.210 Random 0.264 Random 0.304 Ordered 0.270 
Small-World 0.347 Small-World 0.341 Small-World 0.330 Small-World 0.345 
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We see that a small-world network structure is only, and consistently, the second best 
network structure at which the regimes reach their highest AvgK. Though in the case of M1 the 
difference between the highest AvgK is scored at small-world network structure and highest AvgK 
scored at a random network structure is very small. But in the other complex social relations 
regimes, the margin is significantly high. And when we see equity in knowledge distribution, it is 
clear that the regimes score a rather high CoeffVar (lower equity) in a small-world network 
structure compared to ordered or random; and with a very high margin too. Table 4 summarizes 
in a nutshell the results of Table 2 and Table 3. We see that most regimes score their best not with 
small-world network structures but generally with ordered and/or random network structures.  
 
Table 4 Summary of Results in Tables 2 and 3 
Regime 
Network structure at 
which highest AvgK is 
attained 
Network structure at 
which lowest CoeffVar is 
attained 
Perfect Affinity (M1) Random Ordered 
Group Level Complex Relations (M2) Ordered Ordered 
Perfect Homophily (M3) Ordered Ordered 
Individual Level Complex Relations (M4) Random  Random 
 
One hypothesis to test in this study was whether the small-world network structure is the 
most favourable to interaction, learning, and equity; i.e., whether generally highest AvgK and 
lowest CoeffVar are achieved in small-world than ordered and random networks in clusters with 
complex social relations. The results here seem to indicate that this is not the case. Ordered 
networks give quick access to teachers in one’s own social group who are only willing to teach 
you, while random networks give quick access to teachers of distant groups with whom you are 
rewarded if you learn from. This is a reason why ordered and random network structures are 
better for complex social relations, as compared to small-world network structure. This implies 
that the superiority of the small-world network structure does not hold for interactions in 
environments with complex social relations (just as it may not hold, according to Cowan and 
Jonard (2003), for very high absorptive capacity values). This emerges as an important 
proposition, addressing Hypothesis 1, which we can reject. 
 
Proposition 1: The small-world network structure may not be the best network structure for 
highest and most equitable knowledge distribution, when knowledge exchanges are undertaken in 
environments of complex social relations among networked agents in a cluster. 
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5.1.2 Performance of social relations regimes across network structures  
We now address the second hypothesis of this study. This hypothesis has two parts, first, that M1 
is the regime that, compared to the other regimes, and in any network structure, achieves highest 
performance in terms of both AvgK and CoeffVar (Hypothesis 2a). Second, that M3 is the regime 
that performs best among the complex social relations regimes M2, M3, and M4 (Hypothesis 2b). 
Hypothesis 2a is very simple to understand, as, knowledge exchanges are easiest where there are 
no complications in terms of affinities and prejudices between groups, or rewards and penalties 
for learners and teachers, and hence knowledge exchange is pretty smooth. Due to this, 
knowledge is most equitably distributed too. Hypothesis 2b may appear strange at first, 
considering that a regime with perfect homophily will perform the worst at any network structure 
as it has the highest prejudices between social groups. However, the reason we hypothesize that 
M3 is the best performing regime among the other regimes with complex social relations is that 
M3 is nothing but a set of 10x10 unit matrices, which allows for a large majority of interactions 
within these blocks; these therefore being ten versions of what happens with M1.8  
To address these hypotheses, we look at Table 5. 
 
Table 5 For each network structure, which social relations regime performs best 
Ordered Network 
(p=0.001) 
Small-World Network 
(p=0.10) 
Random Network 
(p=1) 
Regime Max AvgK Regime 
Min 
CoeffVar Regime 
Max 
AvgK Regime 
Min 
CoeffVar Regime 
Max 
AvgK Regime 
Min 
CoeffVar 
M1 0.833 M1 0.209 M1 0.834 M1 0.204 M1 0.835 M1 0.210 
M2 0.816 M2 0.215 M2 0.811 M2 0.229 M4 0.813 M4 0.256 
M3 0.801 M3 0.218 M4 0.794 M3 0.245 M2 0.805 M2 0.264 
M4 0.780 M4 0.270 M3 0.762 M4 0.269 M3 0.678 M3 0.304
 
From Table 5 we see that M1 clearly scores the highest AvgK and the lowest CoeffVar 
most consistently across all network structures. Hence, as hypothesized, a cluster with agents 
among whom there is perfect affinity is the one that performs the best. We therefore accept 
Hypothesis 2a, and state Proposition 2.  
Proposition 2: The highest and most equitable knowledge distribution, with informal knowledge 
exchanges among networked agents in a cluster, is achieved when there is perfect affinity among 
the agents. 
                                                 
8 Following this, we can also assume that in M3, cross-group interactions may only be occasional. This is 
not a hypothesis to be tested out in this study, but we explore below extent of cross-group interactions 
between regimes across network structures in the discussion. 
  15
But Hypothesis 2b can be rejected immediately. We see here that among the three 
complex social relations regimes M2, M3 and M4, it is M2 and M4 that generally perform better 
than M3. In fact, M2 takes the lead with a better performance than the other two in an ordered 
and small-world network. And, M3 performs relatively better than M4 only in an ordered 
network. Hence, we can reject Hypothesis 2b.  
We also observe the extent of cross-group interactions in each social relations regime 
across network structure. And very interestingly, the regime that hosts the highest cross-group 
interactions is the one where inter-group prejudices are the highest, i.e., in a perfect homophily 
regime M3. As observed in Table 6, the difference between cross-group interactions in M3 as 
compared to even the regime in second position in this table is very high (double, in an ordered 
and small-world network structures). A perfect affinity regime M1 seems to have lowest inter-
group interaction in two out of three network structures.  
 
Table 6 Proportion of cross-group interactions (as a per cent of all learner-teacher interactions) 
across regimes, for each network structure 
Ordered Network 
(p=0.001) 
Small-World Network 
(p=0.10) 
Random Network 
(p=1) 
Regime Per cent Regime Per cent Regime Per cent 
M3 10.50 M3 37.25 M3 71.50 
M2 5.50 M1 19.00 M2 54.00 
M1 3.25 M2 16.75 M1 49.25 
 
This may be because, in this model, learners are given the highest rewards when prejudices 
are highest, and hence in a perfect homophily regime they strive to tap knowledge from teachers 
out-of-group as much as possible. But it could be argued, as a converse, that teachers are given 
the highest penalties when prejudices are highest and must hence refuse to teach. The reason why 
cross-group interactions are the highest in M3 may simply be because the difference in 
knowledge Δaij between teachers and learners may be low enough to allow the teachers’ payoff 
[6] to remain positive, for teachers to actually agree to impart knowledge learners who come from 
highly prejudiced social groups. The limitation of this, and the reason why we do not frame a 
generalizable proposition here, is that this result may have stemmed out of the way the rewards 
and penalties in this model have been constructed.9  
                                                 
9 Not to suggest that this model has been engineered to give this result – in fact, given the rewards/penalties 
structure, we had assumed in the contrary that M3 would most likely have the lowest cross-group 
interactions. 
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5.2 Individual effects of γ and eL on Performance 
For the discussion that follows in this section, we refer the contour plots and the graphs in Figures 
1 to 5. While results for the complex social relations regimes M2, M3 and M4 are represented by 
contour plots, results for the regime M1 are represented by simple line graphs, as γ has no effect 
in the M1.  
5.2.1 Individual effects of γ and eL on AvgK  
There are clear differences in the results across social relations regimes for each network 
structure, and across network structures for each social relations regime. What is interesting, 
however, is that the results for M3 (at ordered and random network structures) are quite in 
contrast to the other results, in that high AvgK in M3 is achieved at high-γ- medium/high-eL 
levels, whereas for the other regimes, a high AvgK is achieved at high-γ-low-eL levels. In all 
cases, however, high γ levels seem to be always necessary for achieving high AvgK. This is 
corroborated by the line graphs in Figures 3 and 4, which show that in all cases, AvgK is 
increased with increase in γ. Some of these results, though unexpected, are not surprising if we go 
a step deeper and look at the mechanisms involved in their formulation.  
The results for M3 are worthy of comment. Recall from Table 6 that cross-group 
interactions were highest in the perfect homophily regime M3. This regime is special, in that 
learners are offered very high rewards for any cross-group interactions (due to the fact that 
affinity between groups is the lowest in this regime). From the learners’ point of view, γ delivers 
such strong effects that it overpowers eL at low levels of eL. Learners are willing to contact well-
endowed teachers located even at far network distances. But, in an ordered network, this 
overpowering effect of γ over eL lasts only up to a point (as clearly seen in the contour plot for 
M3 at ordered network p=0.001) after which the effect of eL also exerts its influence on learners 
in the same manner as seen in the other regimes. For teachers, in a perfect homophily regime, 
who comes to them for learning is irrelevant (unless the learners are of the same social group – 
when they get high rewards), and they have little disincentive to teach. In a small-world network, 
however, the overpowering effect of γ over eL lasts longer.10 The reason is that in an ordered 
network teachers of other groups are on average very distant in the network, but in a small-world 
network they can be close. Consequently, the cost of approaching good teachers of other social 
groups, in terms of network distance, are lower in small-world networks due to the presence of 
long distance links in the network. Hence, learners enjoy the strong positive effects of γ for longer 
in a small-world network, as clearly seen in the contour plot. 
                                                 
10 Due to the scaling of the AvgK axis in the M3 contour plot at p=0.10, the point after which eL delivers its 
effects is not clearly visible, and appears at around eL = 0.75. 
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The conjectural result while framing Hypotheses 3a (that strong affinity effects, captured 
by the ‘strength of affinity’ parameter γ, and that strong network distance effects, captured by the 
‘strength of network distance’ parameter eL, generally decrease AvgK ) was expected to be so 
since it was logical that with higher γ and higher eL, agents would end up learning only from 
proximate teachers and those in one’s own social group. This would, logically, lead to low levels 
of AvgK in the cluster as a whole, once the interactions were over. As far as the effect of eL goes, 
this conjectural result has turned out correct (except in the case of M3 at ordered and small-world 
network structure). Hence, the part of the Hypothesis 3a that states that strong network distance 
effects would decrease AvgK, can be accepted.  
However, it has turned out that at higher γ levels, learners might have actually preferred 
accessing teachers out-of-group since, as observed also at the end of section 5.1.2, learners are 
given high rewards as prejudices between groups increase, and their rewards are only 
compounded if the effect of social group (through the strength of affinity parameter γ) is 
strengthened furthermore. And as long as Δaij offsets the teacher’s penalty for teaching an out-of-
group learner, interaction commences and learning occurs, which may have very well been the 
case in our simulations. This is one reason why high AvgK is achieved at high γ levels. Thus, the 
part of the Hypothesis 3a that states that strong affinity effects would decrease AvgK, can be 
rejected.  
5.2.2 Individual effects of γ and eL on CoeffVar 
Let us now turn to the individual effects of γ and eL on equity of knowledge distribution, i.e., 
CoeffVar. We had hypothesized that strong affinity effects (through γ) and strong network 
distance effects (through eL) would generally worsen equity (increase CoeffVar). We had 
expected that with higher eL, those learners who were proximate in network distance to very 
knowledgeable teachers would learn more and those who were proximate to not-so-well-
knowledgeable teachers would learn comparatively less, due to which knowledge distribution in 
the cluster would become more unequal. Also, we expected that at higher γ, agents would learn 
only from own-group teachers, which would result in knowledge progressing only in those groups 
with more knowledgeable teachers, with the cluster ultimately ending up in being unequally 
endowed with knowledge.  
Very interestingly, both these conjectural results are refuted. Higher γ and higher eL seem 
to lead to higher equity (lower CoeffVar). Observe the contour plots and line graphs in Figure . 
The darker green patches signifying lower CoeffVar are concentrated in the high-γ-high-eL region 
of the M2, M3 and M4 plots. For the line graph in the M1 column too, we see that CoeffVar 
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decreases with increase in eL. The individual effects of γ and eL in Figure 3 and Figure 4 also 
corroborate this. Hence the Hypothesis 3b that strong affinity effects (through γ) and network 
distance effects (through eL) generally worsen equity (increase CoeffVar) can be rejected. 
6. Summing Up Results, and Lessons 
Two propositions have emerged out of this study: 
(1) Proposition 1: The small-world network structure may not be the best network structure 
for highest and most equitable knowledge distribution, when knowledge exchanges are 
undertaken in environments of complex social relations among networked agents in a 
cluster.  
(2) Proposition 2: The highest and most equitable knowledge distribution, with informal 
knowledge exchanges among networked agents in a cluster, is achieved when there is 
perfect affinity among the agents.  
These are based on the results of this simulation, summed up, as follows, in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 Summary of Results 
Objective Hypothesis Result
Whether a small-
world network 
structure is most 
efficient in a complex 
social relations 
environment 
 
Hypothesis 1: The small-world 
network structure is still the most 
efficient network structure for 
knowledge diffusion, in terms of 
performance (AvgK and CoeffVar), 
in an environment coloured with 
complex social relations. 
 
A small world network structure 
is not prominent in complex 
social relations environments. 
 
Hypothesis 1 is rejected. 
 
Which social-
relations regime 
generally performs 
the best 
Hypothesis 2a: A regime with 
perfect affinity and no complexity 
in social relations, namely M1, is 
the regime that achieves highest 
performance in terms of both AvgK 
and CoeffVar. 
 
M1 (perfect affinity) does turn 
out to be the best performing 
regime in achieving both highest 
AvgK as well as lowest CoeffVar.  
 
Hypothesis 2a is accepted. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: A regime with 
perfect homophily, namely M3, is 
the regime that performs best 
among the complex social relations 
regimes M2, M3, and M4. 
The next best, however, are M2 
and M4 (in a random network). 
M3 seems to perform relatively 
well only in an ordered network. 
 
Hypothesis 2b is rejected. 
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Individual effects of 
strength-of-affinity 
and strength-of-
network distance on 
performance 
Hypothesis 3a: Strong affinity 
effects (captured by the ‘strength of 
affinity’ parameter γ) and network 
distance effects (captured by the 
‘strength of network distance’ 
parameter eL) generally decrease 
AvgK in the cluster as a whole. 
 
The expected result holds for the 
individual effect of eL on AvgK, 
i.e., AvgK decreases with 
increases in eL, especially after 
middle levels of γ. The only 
exception is for M3 in a small-
world network. 
But contrary to expectation, AvgK 
reaches its peak at higher γ levels. 
 
Hypothesis 3a can be rejected for 
γ, but accepted for eL.  
 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Strong affinity 
effects (captured by γ) and network 
distance effects (captured by eL) 
generally worsen equity, i.e. 
increase CoeffVar in the cluster as a 
whole. 
CoeffVar seems to decrease 
(equity improves) with increase in 
eL as well as γ, in all cases, 
contrary to expectation.  
 
Hypothesis 3b can be completely 
rejected. 
 
 
And in addition, we have observed that the regime with the most cross-group interactions is 
M3 (perfect homophily), with even M1 (perfect affinity) generally having much less cross-group 
interaction.  
As we have discussed in section 2.2, a stream of the literature in know-how diffusion across 
social networks in clusters deals with the importance of network architecture and the equity and 
efficiency of knowledge distribution. Vega-Redondo (2007:9), explains that network architecture 
is the key issue while studying diffusion across networks. When we deal with rural traditional-
technology clusters inhabited by economic agents whose only source of new knowledge is 
informal interaction and defensive innovation, enquiring on efficient network structure is 
necessary, as Vega-Redondo explained, but the analysis has to also be coloured with the complex 
social relations that are inevitable in such clusters. This is the contribution of this model to the 
existing series of studies on efficient network structures for knowledge diffusion around a new 
technology. In recent times when production demands and technology upgradation takes the 
foremost priority among agents even in traditional technology clusters, long existing complex 
social relations may still hold sway in economic decision making; but they may not be able to 
grab complete control of agents’ behaviour at an individual level while calculating interaction and 
knowledge exchange decisions. When agents are defensively innovating they might cross these 
social groups to exchange know-how. Even for knowledge givers (‘teachers’ in this model) who 
  20
provide their new know-how, old inclinations to retain group dominance may fall flat. We end the 
study on this positive note: demarcations erected by prejudices between social groups can be 
overcome, permitting knowledge exchanges and learning, and allowing for the aggregate progress 
of a low-tech cluster in an environment of complex social relations. 
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Figure 1 Effect of eL (strength of network distance) and γ (strength of social relations) on AvgK 
 M1 Perfect Affinity M2 Group Level Complex Relations M3 Perfect Homophily M4 Individual Level Complex Relations 
p
 
=
 
0
.
0
0
1
 
 
p
 
=
 
0
.
1
 
 
p
 
=
 
1
 
 
  22
Figure 2 Effect of eL (strength of network distance) and γ (strength of social relations) on CoeffVar 
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Figure 3 Individual effects of γ and eL on AvgK 
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Figure 4 Individual effects of γ and eL on CoeffVar 
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